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In the  1990s,  Latvia  aimed  at introducing  Social  Health  Insurance  (SHI)  but later  changed
to a National  Health  Service  (NHS)  type system.  The  NHS  is ﬁnanced  from  general  taxation,
provides  coverage  to  the  entire  population,  and  pays  for a basic  service  package  purchased
from  independent  public  and  private  providers.  In  November  2013,  the  Cabinet  of Min-
isters  passed  a draft  Healthcare  Financing  Law,  aiming  at increasing  public  expenditures
on  health  by  introducing  Compulsory  Health  Insurance  (CHI)  and  linking  entitlement  to
health  services  to the  payment  of  income  tax.  Opponents  of  the  reform  argue  that  linking
entitlement  to health  services  to  the  payment  of income  tax  does  not  have the  potential  to
increase  public  expenditures  on  health  but  that  it can contribute  to  compromising  univer-
sal  coverage  and  access  to health  services  of  certain  population  groups.  In view  of  strong
opposition,  it is unlikely  that  the  law  will  be adopted  before  parliamentary  elections  in
October  2014.  Nevertheless,  the  discussion  around  the  law  is  interesting  because  of three
main reasons:  (1)  it can  illustrate  why  the  concept  of  SHI  remains  attractive  –  not only  for
Latvia but  also  for  other  countries,  (2)  it shows  that a change  from  NHS to SHI  does  not  imply
major  institutional  reforms,  and  (3) it demonstrates  the  potential  problems  of  introducing
SHI,  i.e.  of linking  entitlement  to health  services  to the  payment  of contributions.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
Y-NC-Nthe  CC  B
. Introduction
The Latvian government passed a draft Healthcare
inancing Law in November 2013 [5]. If this law is
ltimately adopted by parliament, it will fundamentally
hange the principles of the national healthcare ﬁnan-
ing system. The aim is to convert the current tax funded
ational Health Service (NHS) system into a Compulsory
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Health Insurance (CHI) system by linking entitlement to
health services to the payment of income-related contrib-
utions. The reform would have major implications for the
health system by modifying the modalities for the raising of
revenues, by excluding the uninsured from comprehensive
coverage, and possibly by compromising the effectiveness
of the established primary care system [16].
However, the reform would not require major institu-
tional changes as the proposed system would be similar
to health insurance systems in neighbouring Estonia and
Lithuania ([24]). In these countries and in several other
central and eastern European countries ([9,25]), reforms
since the early 1990s have led to one national insur-
ance fund, which pools revenues from income tax with
other government contributions and purchases care from
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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independent public and private providers. Therefore, social
health insurance (SHI) systems in these countries share
many institutional characteristics with the Latvian NHS
system. Consequently, the distinction between NHS and
SHI has become less relevant for describing institutional
characteristics of healthcare systems internationally than
it was in the past [7].
The discussion around the proposed Healthcare Finan-
cing Law in Latvia is interesting because of three main
reasons: (1) it can illustrate why the concept of compul-
sory or social health insurance remains attractive – not only
for Latvia but also for other countries; (2) it shows that a
change from NHS to SHI does not imply major institutional
reforms, and (3) it demonstrates the potential problems
of introducing SHI, i.e. of linking entitlement to health
services to the payment of contributions. Therefore, the
purpose of the paper is to describe the context of the cur-
rent reform proposal and to discuss the expected beneﬁts
and potential problems as put forward by proponents and
opponents of the reform.
The next section brieﬂy describes the history and the
functioning of the Latvian health system, before Section 3
looks at the political and economic context of the reform.
Section 4 then presents the rationale and the content of
the draft Healthcare Financing Law. Subsequently, the pos-
itions of different stakeholders are discussed in Section 5
together with the potential problems put forward by the
opponents of the law. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a
brief assessment of the reform and provides an outlook for
the likeliness of the reform to be implemented in the near
future.
2. The Latvian health system
The move towards Compulsory Health Insurance has to
be viewed in the context of almost 25 years of reforms,
which radically transformed the Latvian health system
after independence of the country in 1991. Similar as in
Estonia and Lithuania ([24]) and, in fact, as in most central
and eastern European countries ([25]), Latvia aimed to cre-
ate a decentralized SHI system with multiple funds in the
early 1990s.
The reasons for this shift towards SHI included a desire
to return to pre-Soviet institutions, to limit the inﬂuence
of politicians over the health system, and to create more
stable and independent revenue streams for the healthcare
sector ([18,25]).
Subsequently, because of apparent problems with
decentralized planning and ﬁnancing, a recentralization
process was initiated. This ﬁrst led to the creation of one
single fund, the State Compulsory Health Insurance Agency
in 2002. In 2005, earmarking of a proportion of the col-
lected personal income tax for health care was abandoned
in favour of general tax ﬁnancing. Finally, the centraliza-
tion process culminated in the creation of the NHS in 2011,
effectively abandoning the concept of social health insur-
ance. Functions of several previously existing institutions
were incorporated into the NHS with the aim of creating
one single institution for the implementation of health poli-
cies in Latvia [14]. However, the purchaser-provider split
was retained, with the NHS continuing to purchase carecy 118 (2014) 147–152
from independent public and private providers – just as
the State Compulsory Health Insurance Agency had done
before.
The Latvian health system provides coverage to the
entire population (Latvians and non-Latvian residents) and
pays for a basic services package, which is guaranteed
by the constitution. The NHS receives its resources from
general tax revenues and purchases care from indepen-
dent public and private providers [14]. Most hospitals are
publicly owned, while most general practitioners work
as independent professionals. Specialists work either as
independent professionals or as employees of hospitals.
All dental practices and pharmacies are privately owned.
Patients are encouraged to register with a GP of their choice
(and more than 96% do so) who will then act as a gate-
keeper. After referral, patients can freely choose a specialist
care provider, although actual choice is often limited – in
particular in rural areas – and waiting lists are substantial.
One of the most important problems is that the sys-
tem is severely underfunded: total health expenditure in
2012 was only US$1188 PPP per capita (corresponding to
6% of GDP), which was  the third lowest amount spent on
health in the EU [23]. Furthermore, only about 57% (2012)
of total spending came from public sources–a share, which
is lower only in Bulgaria and Cyprus. Insufﬁcient public
funding means that patients are exposed to substantial user
charges and direct payments, in particular for pharmaceut-
icals [14]. Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments account for 37%
of total health expenditures, one of the highest rates in the
EU (behind only Bulgaria and Cyprus).
The proportion of the population reporting an unmet
medical need because of costs doubled during the ﬁnancial
crisis, reaching more than 14% in 2011 before reducing to
just above 10% in 2012 [6]. In Estonia, Lithuania, and Slove-
nia less than 1% of the population report an unmet medical
need because of costs, and the proportion is below 3% on
average in the EU. Furthermore, important inequities exist
in Latvia as the proportion of the population with unmet
medical needs (not only because of costs) is much higher
in the poorest income quintile (29%) than in the richest
income quintile (10%).
3. Economic and political context of the reform
During the recent ﬁnancial and economic crisis, GDP
dropped more strongly in Latvia than in any other EU
member state, declining by almost 18% in 2009 [22]. As
part of the Economic Stabilization and Growth Revival Pro-
gramme, signiﬁcant spending cuts were made in the health
care sector [1]. The Ministry of Health’s budget dropped
by 12.6% in 2009 (to LVL 503.7 million) [12]. Salaries of
all health workers were cut on average by 20% ([24]), and
patients’ co-payments were raised signiﬁcantly [14]. Pub-
lic spending on health as a share of GDP dropped from 4.3%
of GDP in 2007 to about 3.4% in 2012 [23].
Following parliamentary elections in 2011, a new coali-
tion government consisting of two centre-right parties
(Zatlers’ Reform Party and Unity) and one right-wing party
(National Alliance) took ofﬁce. Members of Unity (or more
precisely of a predecessor party) had strongly supported
the idea of returning to SHI already under the previous
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overnment (2009 until 2011). Under the impression of
he economic crisis, the most important arguments at the
ime were that linking health services to the payment of
ncome tax would contribute to increasing income tax rev-
nues and that excluding Latvians who emigrated abroad
and consequently did not pay income tax) from receiving
ealth services at home would improve service availability
or residents in Latvia. In 2009, a working group was estab-
ished to assess the feasibility and beneﬁts of introducing
HI [2] but the resulting report did not support a change of
he ﬁnancing system [11].
Nevertheless, when Dr Ingrida Circene from Unity
as appointed Minister of Health in 2011, the idea
f introducing compulsory health insurance re-emerged.
he government included the introduction of compulsory
ealthcare insurance in its action plan, principally arguing
ith the aim of increasing public spending for health [3].
n May  2013, the Cabinet of Ministers formally supported
he introduction of compulsory healthcare insurance [4],
nd a draft “Healthcare Financing Law” was passed by the
abinet of Ministers in November 2013 [5]. The law was
riginally scheduled to be enacted in July 2014. However,
y September 2014 it had not yet passed the second (of
hree) readings in parliament because of strong opposition
rom multiple stakeholders (see Section 5).
. The proposed Healthcare Financing Law and its
xpected beneﬁts
The main aim of the draft Healthcare Financing Law is to
vercome the lack of public resources for health, to ensure
nancial sustainability, and to improve access of the popu-
ation to health services. Speciﬁcally, expenditures are to be
ncreased by 0.25% of GDP per year in order to reach 4.5% of
DP by 2020 [16]. The beneﬁts of such increased spending
re explicitly mentioned (see Table 1): more rehabilitation
ervices, improved access to pharmaceuticals, reduced cost
haring, and increased salaries of healthcare professionals.
The draft law suggests that raising more resources for
ealth could be achieved through the introduction of “Com-
ulsory Health Insurance”. According to the law, two  main
hanges would have to be implemented: (1) Earmarking
 proportion of income tax revenues for health; and (2)
inking eligibility to health services to the payment of
ncome tax or contributions. The underlying assumption
s that making eligibility to healthcare services dependent
n income tax payment will provide incentives to pay
axes, which would contribute to reducing the share of
he shadow economy, and consequently lead to higher tax
evenues.
As a result of the reform, the composition of the NHS
udget would change (Fig. 1). In 2014 (pre-reform), the
udget is entirely based on general tax revenues, thus
ncluding resources collected through different forms of
axes. From 2015 onwards (post-reform), the CHI budget
ould consist of three parts: (1) an earmarked “State Com-
ulsory Health Insurance Payment”, which would be equal
o the central government’s share of income tax (i.e. cur-
ently 20%) (the remaining 80% of income tax revenues are
urrently allocated to municipalities). (2) Other allocations
rom general tax revenues, which would still account forcy 118 (2014) 147–152 149
the majority of CHI resources, i.e. an estimated 63% in 2015.
(3) Voluntary insurance contributions from people who  do
not pay income tax, which would, however, contribute only
a very small proportion to overall CHI revenues. Growth
of the CHI budget from 2015 to 2016 is expected to come
mainly through a growth of the central government’s bud-
get allocation (Fig. 1).
Eligibility to the full set of healthcare services currently
available in the NHS would be limited to three categories
of the population:
1. Payers of income tax who  have paid taxes for at least
11 months during the calendar year or who have an
annual taxable income above the minimal monthly
salary (D 320 in 2014) times twelve.
2. Exempt groups, including children under 18, retired or
disabled people, registered unemployed, full time stu-
dents between age 18 and 30, people receiving social
beneﬁts and others.
3. Payers of regular voluntary insurance premiums (D 28
per month) or those who make a one-time payment of
three times the minimum wage at the time of need-
ing healthcare and subsequently continue to pay regular
premiums. It has been estimated that this group would
consist of only about 7250 people (an estimated 5% of
the 145,000 Latvian residents who  do not pay income tax
and who  do not belong to any of the exempt categories)
[16].
Nevertheless, a narrowly deﬁned package of basic
healthcare services would continue to be available to
the entire population in order to ensure conformity with
the constitution. This would include emergency care and
all reimbursed pharmaceuticals, plus elective care for
selected patient groups (e.g. diabetics, psychiatric and can-
cer patients) and conditions (e.g. pregnant women).
The law does not propose signiﬁcant institutional
changes to the health system, i.e. the pooling of resources
by a single institution and the purchasing of care from
independent providers would be retained. Money would
continue to ﬂow from the state budget to the NHS; and
care would continue to be purchased by the NHS with its
regional branch ofﬁces.
5. Stakeholder positions and potential problems of
the reform
The Minister of Health was strongly supportive of the
draft Healthcare Financing Law. She believed that there
was no political and public support for increasing the share
of the government budget for health, and that introducing
insurance was  the only option available for increasing pub-
lic expenditures on health [21]. In addition, the Ministry
argues that the current way of ﬁnancing is unfair because
tax payers have to cover the costs of services consumed by
others [16].
However, there is no uniform support of the draft Law
even among Unity party members, with the Ministry of
Finance being opposed to the idea of earmarking income
tax for health. In fact, “differences in opinions”, including
those related to the draft Law, and “lack of constructive
150 U. Mitenbergs et al. / Health Policy 118 (2014) 147–152
Table 1
Healthcare spending and provision: 2011 compared with targets for 2016 and 2020.
2011 2016 2020
Central government healthcare budget as a percentage of GDPa 3.4% 3.7% 4.5%
Share  of general government spending as a percentage of THE 59% 64% 68%
Share  of private spending (OOP and VHI) as a percentage of THE 41% 36% 32%
Volume of publicly ﬁnanced rehabilitation services
Children 1417 9239 19,739
Growth n/a 552% 114%
Adults  1438 22,166 154,896
Growth n/a 1441% 599%
Number of patients receiving reimbursed pharmaceuticals 524,282 581,927 661,927
Growth n/a 11% 14%
Cost-sharing
Patient fee (co-payment) per day for in-patient stay (starting from the second day)b 12.81 6.40 6.40
Co-payment for inpatient surgical interventions 42.69 21.34 21.34
Share  of publicly ﬁnanced outpatient specialist visits 35% 49% 74%
Salary  ratio versus average salary
Physicians 1.18 1.58 2.18
Nurses 0.71 0.95 1.31
Nurse  assistants 0.47 0.63 0.87
Source: [4,16].
ers to al
 the act
id=1507a 2011 data is based on WHO  Regional Ofﬁce for Europe (2014) and ref
b According to the Draft concept of healthcare system ﬁnancing model –
of  Ministers. Regulations Nr. 1046. Available at: http://likumi.lv/doc.php?
cooperation” led to the resignation of the Minister of Health
on July 7, 2014 [13]. Among the supporters of the draft Law
is The Latvian Umbrella Body for Disability Organizations
(SUSTENTO). SUSTENTO’s support is related to the aim of
increasing public expenditures for health; and the organi-
zation supports the idea of introducing compulsory health
insurance ([26]).
Opposition to the proposed law comes from municipal-
ities, from the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia [17],
and from professional organizations of physicians. Munic-
ipalities are mostly concerned about losing some part of
their share of income tax. Other criticism is related to
four main problems, which were also highlighted during a
consultative meeting held by experts of the World Health
Organization upon request of the Ministry of Health (the
results of which were leaked to mass media) [21]:
Fig. 1. Budget (in million EUR) for provision of healthcare in 2014 and projecte
*According to the draft Law, some voluntary insurance premiums would be colle
of  insurance premiums as of July 2014 in order to be eligible for public healthcar
2015, adjusted to annual budget. Note: The budget for provision of healthcare in
income; the ﬁnal approved budget for provision of healthcare in 2014 was 609.9
central government and 1.1 million Euros from paid services and other income [1
Source: [16].l public expenditure on health (not only from the central government).
ual patient fee per day for in-patient stay was 13.52 EUR in 2011 (Cabinet
66#piel1).
• First, it is questionable if the reform would lead to
increased public expenditures on health and sustaina-
bility of ﬁnancing. As is evident from Fig. 1, the size of the
total public healthcare budget would depend largely on
the size of the general state’s budget allocation. There are
no binding expenditure targets in the draft law [16]. The
healthcare budget would continue to depend on political
negotiations in parliament.
• Second, it is unlikely that the willingness to pay income
tax would increase as a result of the reform. Despite its
name, the compulsory health insurance would be vol-
untary for those working in the informal economy. As a
result, workers in the informal economy could chose to
remain uninsured or to pay voluntary premiums, which
– at current premium levels – would be more attractive
than paying income tax.
d composition of the Compulsory Health Insurance budget 2015–2016.
cted in 2014: those joining the system voluntarily must start payments
e services as of July 2015. **Based on planned budget for July–December
 2014 includes a small amount of income from paid services and other
 million Euros, which included 608.8 million budget allocation from the
0].
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Table 2
Expected beneﬁts and potential problems of the Healthcare Financing
Reform Law.
Dimension Expected beneﬁtsa Potential problems
Public health
budget
Earmarked revenues
will lead to growth of
the public health
budget and greater
sustainability of the
healthcare ﬁnancing
system
There are no speciﬁc
binding expenditure
targets in the draft law
[16]. The assumption that
an insurance system with
earmarked revenues for
health through payroll
contributions offers more
stable revenue for health is
not supported by evidence
[9].
Effect of
earmarking
Linking eligibility to
payment of
contributions will
provide an incentive
to pay taxes, leading
to a reduction of the
shadow economy
and higher tax
revenues
It is unlikely that
motivation to pay taxes
would increase if
earmarking is in place.
Workers in the informal
economy could chose to
remain uninsured or to pay
voluntary premiums,
which–at current premium
levels–would be more
attractive than paying
income tax [21].
Access to
care
More public
resources for health
will lead to improved
access to healthcare
services (for those
covered by
insurance)
Universal coverage will be
compromised: an
estimated 137,000 people
[16] would be excluded
from the public healthcare
system (beyond basic
healthcare services). There
is  also a risk of being
excluded from the system
despite eligibility for
exemption. This could lead
to delays in receiving
services only after appeal.
Equity Improved equity
because tax evasion
will be reduced,
making everybody
contribute to health
according to ability
to pay
General tax ﬁnancing has a
greater potential to achieve
equity in ﬁnancing – the
rich contribute with a
greater share of their
income than the poor [21].
Efﬁciency Improved efﬁciency Undermining the
established primary care
system and potentially
contributing to less
efﬁcient patterns of service
provision. Additional costs
associated with the
implementation of the
reform [16].
Health status Improved health
status because more
public resources
allow to provide
Deterioration of health
status due to worsening of
access.U. Mitenbergs et al. / He
Third, the reform would compromise universal cover-
age: an estimated 137,000 people [16] would be left out
of the public healthcare system (beyond basic health-
care services). This would include vulnerable people with
irregular or low income if they do not fall into any of the
exempted categories and are unable or unwilling to pay
voluntary premiums.
Fourth, the reform would lead to considerable additional
administrative burden: veriﬁcation of insurance status,
administering the collection of voluntary contributions,
ensuring access for exempted population groups, rais-
ing awareness of the need to obtain healthcare insurance
– sufﬁcient resources for these tasks would have to be
made available in order to ensure proper transition to an
insurance system.
Fifth, the reform could undermine the established pri-
mary care system. People excluded from coverage and
unable to pay for timely primary or secondary ambu-
latory care, would still be eligible to receive emergency
care at hospitals. This could lead to an increased use of
emergency services in hospitals, potentially contributing
to less efﬁcient patterns of service provision.
For physicians, lack of access to care for uninsured is
he most important argument against the reform. However,
peculations about more palpable ﬁnancial reasons also
xist: GPs might lose some of their capitation payments,
f the reform was implemented because they currently
eceive payment for registered emigrants who never use
heir services.
Only relatively little attention has been paid to impli-
ations of the reform for progressivity of ﬁnancing. This is
ecause the reform is not expected to have a signiﬁcant
mpact on how the system is ﬁnanced: it will continue to
e ﬁnanced mainly through taxes (an earmarked propor-
ion of income tax plus general taxation). It is difﬁcult to
redict the effect of voluntary contributions on progressiv-
ty. If they contribute to raising revenues from people with
ood incomes in the informal economy, they may, in fact,
ncrease fairness. However, if they place a disproportionate
urden on low income households, they will be unfair.
. Conclusions: assessment of and outlook for the
eform
Table 2 summarizes the expected beneﬁts of the
roposed Healthcare Financing Law and the potential prob-
ems put forward by opponents of the reform. Both, the
xpected beneﬁts and the potential problems mirror those
iscussed for other countries [8,19]. Governments con-
emplating the introduction of SHI mostly do so based
n arguments that it would improve the ability of raising
evenues for health, making healthcare ﬁnancing more pre-
ictable (independent of political interference), and that
eople would be more willing to contribute if eligibility
or healthcare services is linked to making contributions
19]. However, it is clear that the healthcare budget could
lso be increased independently of whether income tax
s earmarked for health or not, and that linking health-
are entitlement to the payment of contributions will
reate access problems for the uninsured [20]. In addition,more health services
a Based on [4].
the administrative burden of collecting contributions and
running a comprehensive exemption system can be sub-
stantial.
The development of the Latvian healthcare system since
2002 shows that switching between SHI and NHS is not
related to large institutional reforms. Pooling of resources
and purchasing of care are carried out by one national
alth Poli
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institution under relatively tight control of the govern-
ment, independent of whether the institution carries the
word insurance in its name. Therefore, the concepts of
NHS and SHI are unable to adequately describe institu-
tional characteristics of a health system [7]. Nevertheless,
as illustrated in Table 2, the regulatory change of linking
entitlement to healthcare services to the payment of con-
tributions can imply signiﬁcant changes to the functioning
of the health system, which can have potential beneﬁts but
may  also create important problems.
Despite being accepted in a ﬁrst reading in Parliament
at the end of 2013, it is unlikely that the draft Health-
care Financing Law will be enacted in its current form.
In response to considerable opposition from stakeholders,
Parliament’s Budget and Finance Commission decided in
March 2014 to establish a working group to prepare the
second reading of the draft Healthcare Financing Law. Yet,
by September 2014, a second reading for the law had not
been scheduled. Minister of Health Ingrida Circene was one
of the most important supporters, pushing for the law to be
enacted. However, as mentioned above, she resigned in July
2014 because of lack of support from the government coali-
tion [15]. Her resignation makes it even more unlikely that
the law will be passed by Parliament prior to the upcom-
ing elections in October 2014. It is unclear whether the
introduction of compulsory health insurance will become a
point on the agenda of a future government. While multiple
stakeholders are strongly opposed to the idea, the appar-
ent lack of public ﬁnancing for health and the support from
certain (right-wing) politicians, might bring the topic onto
the agenda once again.
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